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CIVIL CLAIM SETTLEMENT TALKS
INVOLVING THIRD PARTIES AND
INSURANCE COMPANY ADJUSTERS: WHEN
SHOULD LAWYER CONDUCT STANDARDS
APPLY?
JEFFREY A. PARNESSt
INTRODUCTION
Operating on behalf of insurance companies, adjusters have
long been active in facilitating settlements of civil claims.
Adjusters work both before and during lawsuits to help resolve
differences between the companies and company insureds, thus
engaging in first-party adjusting. Adjusters also facilitate pre-
lawsuit and post-lawsuit civil claim settlements between their
companies and those harmed by company insureds. Such third-
party adjusting and first-party adjusting are quite distinct. For
example, they raise very different issues regarding the possible
application of professional services or civil procedure standards
governing lawyers to nonlawyer adjusters.
Some important issues on applying lawyer conduct
standards to adjusters in third-party settings have been
resolved. Resolutions have been made in areas such as the
unauthorized practice of law and the mandatory attendance of
adjusters at settlement conferences in pending civil actions.' To
t Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law; B.A., Colby
College; J.D., University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Tim Denny, my
research assistant, and Therese Clarke and Charles Condon, Northern Illinois
University law librarians, for their help.
I Of course, unauthorized legal practice standards may bar lawyers as well as
nonlawyers from engaging in certain acts. Compare In re Banks, 805 A.2d 990, 994
(D.C. 2002) (noting the unauthorized-practice-of-law rule covers conduct by
nonlawyers who, though law school graduates, were never admitted to practice and
who misrepresent themselves to the public as the functional equivalent of lawyers),
with NEV. SUP. CT. R. 189(4) (recognizing the unauthorized-practice-of-law rule
covers conduct by lawyers, including out-of-state lawyers who establish in-state
legal practice offices and in-state lawyers who provide legal services though they are
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date these resolutions demonstrate serious conflicts over the
applicability of lawyer conduct standards. Similar and related
resolutions will likely continue in coming years, prompting the
need for a more comprehensive study of the application of lawyer
conduct standards to third-party adjusting.
In such an examination, a central question should emerge:
When should insurance company employees undertaking third-
party adjustments be governed by the same or similar
professional legal services and civil procedure standards that
govern lawyers who facilitate civil claim settlements for their
clients? Those who find the question bizarre need only consider
the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,2 where the court found that some insurance
company adjusters dealing with unrepresented third parties
must abide by certain professional legal services standards on
truthful representations usually applicable to lawyers. 3 They
can also look to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in In re Novak, where the court found that a nonparty
insurance company adjuster, as well as the lawyer for the
insured, could be compelled to attend a pretrial conference to
discuss possible settlement of a third-party claim against an
insured/cient.4  These decisions accompany other singular
discussions of the central question. Unfortunately, there has
never been a comprehensive examination of when lawyer
conduct standards should apply to third-party adjusting.
In approaching this central question, distinctions seem
necessary between authorized and unauthorized legal practice
acts by adjusters; between pre-lawsuit and post-lawsuit adjuster
conduct; between adjuster conduct before and after attorneys
have been retained; between the regulatory authority of
inactive or suspended members of the Nevada Bar).
Courts may order parties to produce individuals with full settlement authority
at pretrial conferences. The insurer must provide the necessary individual or grant
settlement authority to the party or his attorney. See In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397,
1408 (11th Cir. 1991).
2 45 P.3d 1068 (Wash. 2002).
3 The cited standards appear in the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct
whose preliminary statement notes: "The Rules of Professional Conduct are
mandatory in character. The rules state the minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action .... The rules make
no attempt to ... undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for
professional conduct." WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003).
4 932 F.2d at 1408.
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legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies; and between
post-lawsuit adjuster activities that occur within and outside of
courthouses.
After briefly reviewing the Jones and Novak decisions, this
Article explores other settings involving the interplay between
lawyer conduct standards and third-party adjusting. Other
settings explored include ex parte communications, privileged
conversations, work product material, settlement authority, and
good faith negotiation. This Article urges that courts, as rule
makers; legislatures; and administrative agencies should have
some voice in determining how adjusters act and in whether
adjusters should abide by lawyer conduct standards. Finally,
this Article concludes that, at times, laws should treat
differently comparable third-party settlement actions by
insurance company adjusters and by lawyers. It concludes with
a call for more comprehensive inquiries into lawyer conduct
standards and third-party adjusting.
I. JONES V. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
Janet and Terry Jones sued Allstate Insurance Company in
a Washington state court asserting negligent legal practice, bad
faith, civil fraud, and consumer protection claims based upon the
acts of its employee Christy Klein. 5 Klein was a nonlawyer
claims adjuster who attempted to resolve disputes between the
Joneses and company insureds, members of the France family. 6
All claims centered on an accident in which Jeremy France ran a
stop sign and broadsided a car driven by Janet Jones.7 The
resulting medical expenses for Janet alone totaled nearly
$75,000.8 The Allstate policy had a $25,000 limit on bodily
injuries.9 An insurance policy the Joneses had with Farmers
provided underinsured motorist coverage.10
At issue in the high court was the legal sufficiency of the
negligent legal practice claims.1  The court sustained the
5 Jones, 45 P.3d at 1071.
G Id. at 1070-71.
7 Id. at 1071.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1072.
10 Id. at 1071.
11 Id. at 1073 (examining intermediate appellate court certification to high
court of a case involving a trial court grant of partial summary judgment to the
Joneses on the basis that under Washington law Allstate "engaged in the
2003]
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claims 12 and held "that insurance claims adjusters, when
preparing and completing documents which affect the legal
rights of third-party claimants and when advising third parties
to sign such documents, must comply with the standard of care
of a practicing attorney."1 3  The relevant pre-lawsuit
preparation, completion, and advice provided by Klein to the
Joneses involved an insurance payment by Farmers, a release
and other papers involving a $25,000 bodily injury payment by
Allstate, and certain subrogation waivers. 14 The professional
legal services standards that govern lawyers were deemed
applicable to Klein and involved responsibilities of "an attorney
to an unrepresented third party" 5 and included duties regarding
corrections of certain misunderstandings, conflicts of interest,
and informed decision making.'6
unauthorized, negligent practice of law and breached its fiduciary duties to the
Joneses" by advising them to settle without indicating the "consequences" and by
not maintaining "a plainly adversarial posture" with them).
2 The civil claim analysis might differ dramatically if the relevant legal
practice acts of the nonlawyer adjuster were unauthorized. The court in Jones
expressly declined to reach the issue of authorization because it found that no
request for an injunction against the alleged unauthorized practice of law had been
made. Id. at 1071. Compare Commonwealth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 A.2d 135, 141
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (finding that the use by adjusters of Allstate brochures and
other form documents did not constitute the practice of law, although it may be
barred under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law or under
the Unfair Insurance Practices Act), with Jones, 45 P.3d at 1079 (holding that by
preparing legal documents and giving advice affecting legal rights, Klein was
engaged in the practice of law).
Incidentally, Jones may be troublesome for summarily determining that one
engaging in unauthorized legal practice who harms another that in good faith
believed there was proper authorization owes only a duty to act reasonably. One
could ask: Why was the good faith belief by the Joneses in the authority of Klein to
act as she did sufficient to prompt a duty? Is it correct to hold an adjuster
responsible for discerning legal practice boundaries when dealing with third-party
accident victims, especially when the adjuster never said she was giving legal advice
and the Joneses had consulted a lawyer about other aspects of the accident? Id. at
1072 (noting that the Joneses met with lawyers to discuss possible defective seat
belt claims). Conversely, one could ask: Why is there not strict liability for all who
cause harm when acting in ways that are unauthorized by law?
1:3 Jones, 45 P.3d at 1075. Beside such document work, the court noted that
legal practice can involve representation in a court of justice and the provision of
certain forms of "advice and counsel." Id. at 1074. Seemingly, a broader definition of
the practice of law appears in Washington General Rule 24(a) (indicating that legal
practice includes representation in a "formal dispute resolution process" and
"negotiation of legal rights or responsibilities"). WASH. GEN. R. 24(a).
14 Jones, 45 P.3d at 1072.
'r Id. at 1077.
113 See id. at 1077-79 (citing WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3, 1.7(b),
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In sustaining the negligent legal practice claims, the
Supreme Court of Washington pointed to other settings in which
nonlawyers acting like lawyers owe duties under tort law that
are tied to professional legal services standards. 17 One setting
involves the activities of mortgage lenders in preparing loan
documents;18 another involves licensed brokers and salespeople
who "complete form earnest money agreements."' 19 A third
example involves escrow agents dealing with buyers and sellers
who have "adverse interests." 20 The high court did not say why
these other settings were so comparable, though only in Jones
were there existing civil claims that might trigger private
lawsuits for individual redress, 21 making the relevant nonlawyer
work on these claims much more likely connected to professional
legal services provided inside courthouses.
The Jones court did not look beyond tort law and
professional legal services grounds in allowing nonlawyers like
Klein to act like lawyers prior to litigation but requiring them to
follow professional services standards.22  There were other
available analogous grounds. For example, the Washington
Admission to Practice Rules expressly allow certain nonlawyers,
as licensed limited practice officers, to process documents
affecting "the legal rights" of parties in certain property
transactions. 23 A Washington General Rule allows a nonlawyer
1.4(b) (2003)). The majority, but not the dissent, also looked to the duties owed by
lawyers who represent two or more clients simultaneously. See WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g). Based on those duties, the court found that Christy Klein
represented the Joneses. Jones, 45 P.3d at 1078-79, 1084 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
The majority hints that professional legal services standards applicable to
insurance company adjusters in third-party settings may not always operate exactly
as they do for lawyers. See id. at 1076-77 (noting that duties are "akin" to those of
attorneys and that the essence of duties are those of attorneys).
17 Jones, 45 P.3d at 1074-75.
18 Id. at 1075 (citing Perkins v. CTX Mortgage Co., 969 P.2d 93, 105-06 (Wash.
1999)).
1 Id. (citing Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 694 P.2d 630, 635 (Wash.
1985)).
20 Id. at 1078 (citing Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 675 P.2d 193, 200
(Wash. 1983)).
21 Id. at 1075.
22 Id. at 1077.
2:1 WASH. ADMIS. PRAC. R. 12(e)(2)(ii) (authorizing certain lay persons to select,
prepare, and complete legal documents incident to the closing of real estate and
personal property transactions); see Bishop v. Jefferson Title Co., 28 P.3d 802, 810
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that lay persons who exceed the scope of acts
permitted under Rule 12 engage in the unauthorized practice of law).
2003]
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to engage in certain acts that seemingly constitute the practice of
law, including "[a]cting as a lay representative authorized by
administrative agencies or tribunals."24 Another General Rule
expressly recognizes that a nonlawyer may be authorized by a
published Supreme Court opinion to undertake conduct
constituting the practice of law in Washington, as did Klien's
conduct in Jones.25 Because the conduct of Christy Klein was not
random or unauthorized but flowed from Allstate policies, 26 a
better approach to resolving issues involving the conduct of
insurance company's employees in pre-lawsuit third-party
adjusting would have been to proceed by a new General Rule, if
not creating a new Admission to Practice Rule. Any new rule
would follow quasi-legislative hearings in which all interested
persons could participate. 27 One appealing feature of any new
rule could be requirements for certain mandatory disclosures by
adjusters in third-party settings, like the new rules in Florida
regarding compelled disclosures by lawyers to clients about
lawyer roles where the lawyers are hired by insurers to defend
policyholders; 28 the rules in Ohio dictating certain disclosures by
lawyers about insurance and other matters to potential clients
soon after accidents or disasters have befallen the potential
clients;29 or the proposed rules demanding that lawyers provide
24 WASH. GEN. R. 24(b)(3).
25 Id. R. 24(b)(10).
216 Allstate's "confidential plan, known as Claims Core Process Redesign
(CCPR)," was adopted in "the early 1990s" and "generated a wave of litigation."
John Budlong, Domino Strategy, 37 TRIAL 20, 20-21 (2001). "State attorneys
general, state bar associations, and private individuals have filed at least fifty-six
lawsuits against Allstate in twenty-two states, alleging that these [CCPR] practices
are fraudulent, deceptive, confusing, and illegal. The suits seek ... damages and
injunctive relief on behalf of third-party claimants and Allstate's own insureds." Id.
at 21. The plan apparently continued to operate even after a few courts deemed its
practices illegal. Id. at 22 ("Despite [such] rulings, Allstate's illegal practice of law
and defiance of state consumer protection acts continues unabated.").
27 See WASH. GEN. R. 9(a)(2) (stating that public process rule making provides
an opportunity for all interested persons and groups to have their views regarding a
proposed rule heard).
2 FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.7(e) (2003). This rule was prompted in
part because insureds often misunderstood the lawyer's role and even some insurers
were confused. Joan C. Rogers, Florida Adds Two Ethics Rules Regarding Insurance
Defense Lawyers, Staff Counsel, 19 A.B.A./B.N.A. LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF.
CONDUCT 96 (2003).
29J OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(H)(1) (2003).
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statements of clients' rights and lawyers' responsibilities when
discussing contingency fee retainer agreements. 30
Furthermore, the supreme court in Jones did not look for
support in legal grounds allowing nonlawyers to act like lawyers
during civil litigation but requiring them to follow civil
procedure standards. For example, the Washington Superior
Court Civil Rules on civil procedure for courthouse proceedings,
supplemented by inherent judicial power precedents, 31 may
apply to insurance company adjusters at pretrial conferences
when negotiating the settlements presented against company
insureds. An analogous application was found in the following
federal case.
II. IN RE NOVAK
In In re Novak, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
interpreted the 1983 version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16 to allow parties with attorneys and agents of parties,
including adjusters employed by nonparty insurers, to be ordered
to personally attend certain pretrial settlement conferences.3 2
Rule 16 at that time only expressly permitted unrepresented
parties or lawyers for parties to be compelled to attend pretrial
conferences.3 3 The court in Novak found these expressed limits
too narrow, explaining that where the parties are represented,
problems can arise at settlement conferences attended only by
lawyers in two different circumstances. 34 The first circumstance
is when an otherwise represented party refuses to delegate full
30 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Consumer Protection in the Legal Marketplace: A
Legal Consumer's Bill of Rights Is Needed, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 16-17
(2002) (describing model legislation drafted by the American Legislative Exchange
Council).
3 The Washington Court Rule on pretrial conferences and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16 do not expressly note either settlement facilitation or nonparty
insurance adjuster participation in settlement conferences run by trial court judges.
WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 16; FED. R. CIv. P. 16; see, e.g., O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 458
P.2d 154, 158 (Wash. 1969) ("We hold... that we have the inherent power to waive
the requirements of our rules."); see also Mich. Ct. R. 2.401(F) (stating that the
presence of "representatives of insurance carriers" may be compelled). Federal
district courts have recognized the court's inherent powers to compel the presence of
nonparty insurance company adjusters at settlement conferences. See, e.g., In re
Novak, 932 F.2d at 1406-07 n.8 (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)).
:12 Novak, 932 F.2d at 1407-08.
33 Id. at 1405.
34 Id. at 1406-07.
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settlement authority to her lawyer.3 The second arises when a
nonparty insurer in charge refuses to delegate settlement
authority to either the named party or to her attorney.36 In
these situations, "a pretrial conference participant's ability to
discuss settlement is impaired, and the value of the conference
may be limited."37 Thus, while Rule 16 does not expressly allow
for compulsory attendance orders "directed at represented
parties or nonparty insurers,"38 the court in Novak found that
such orders are permitted. 39 Authorization was found in two
sources. One source was the inherent power of the court; 40 the
other source was Rule 16.4' Beyond the court's inherent power,
the Novak court found that "a party who refuses to give full
settlement authority to his attorney and who retains control over
settlement negotiations is, in fact, his own attorney for
settlement purposes. ' 42 Therefore, because the party is then
seen as unrepresented for settlement purposes, the court
interpreted the 1983 version of Rule 16 to permit the court to
compel the attendance of an otherwise represented party at a
settlement conference. 43 If a nonparty insurer is truly in charge,
the insurer's attendance can be accomplished through an order
directed at the insured,44 with the adjuster as his agent as in
35 Id. at 1405-06. Such a refusal is not blameworthy and is actually encouraged
by professional legal services standards. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Austin W.
Bartlett, Unsettling Questions Regarding Lawyer Civil Claim Settlement Authority,
78 OR. L. REV. 1061, 1080-99 (1999) (discussing delegation of settlement authority).
36 Novak, 932 F.2d at 1405-06. The court ultimately held that the trial court is
"unauthorized, by statute, rule, or its inherent power, to order Novak, an employee
of the defendants' insurer, to appear before it to facilitate settlement discussions."
Id. at 1409. Even so, the insurance adjuster's presence could be compelled by an
order directed to the named party to produce someone with settlement authority
who then, as an insured, could send the insurance company adjuster as an agent.
Id.
:7 Id. at 1406.
:'8 Id.
39 Id. at 1408.
40 Id. at 1406 n.18 (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871
F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989), where there were significant disagreements between
the judges over the breadth of inherent judicial power given the presence of a
written rule on compelling attendance at pretrial conferences).
41 Id. at 1407 n. 19 (construing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 liberally).
42 Id.
4:1 Id. ("[T]here is a colorable argument that Rule 16, on its face, empowers the
court to order such a party to attend a pretrial settlement conference; the party is
an unrepresented party with respect to settlement, and, thus, his attendance is
crucial.").
4- Id. at 1408.
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Novak, where the adjuster had the authority to make settlement
decisions and the interests of both parties were "aligned."
45
Presumably, insurance company adjusters, like Roger
Novak, who are compelled to attend pretrial settlement
conferences in civil actions must act as or "akin" to 46 lawyers
under civil procedure rules because they serve as representatives
of the parties. Civil procedure standards usually require, inter
alia, substantial preparation and good faith participation, with
sanctions available upon noncompliance.47
Similar to Jones, while the result in Novak seems correct,
there were better avenues to achieve the same result. Inherent
power, while "a potentially useful tool for effecting settlement,
even if there is some difficulty in finding a legal basis for [it],"48
"encourages judicial high-handedness," 49  invites "judicial
abuse,"50 and undermines "uniformity of practice" by permitting
each trial court "to march to its own drummer."5' Additionally, a
rule seems overly stretched when a provision on unrepresented
parties covers some parties who are chiefly represented by
counsel.52 As in Jones, judicial rule making is a better avenue to
resolving issues of adjuster conduct. 53
III. PRE-LAWSUIT SETTLEMENT TALKS
The court in Jones found that pre-lawsuit settlement talks
between insurance company adjusters and third parties
implicated certain professional services standards that involved
"an attorney" and "an unrepresented third party," including
standards on corrections of misunderstandings, 54 conflicts of
45 Id. at 1408 n.20.
46 Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1076 (Wash. 2002).
47 See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 16(f) (stating that sanctions are available against a
party's attorney who appears at a pretrial conference "substantially unprepared" or
who "fails to participate in good faith" at the conference).
48 G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 657 (7th Cir.
1989) (Posner, J., dissenting).
49 Id. (Posner, J., dissenting); id. at 670 (Manion, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 661 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
r Id. at 666 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
52 See Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Thinking Outside the Civil
Case Box Reformulating Pretrial Conference Laws, 50 KAN. L. REV. 347, 365 (2002)
(criticizing the Novak court's reading of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16).
53 Id. at 369-74 (urging amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
while demonstrating the available models in certain state and local trial court rules
on compelling insurance adjusters to attend settlement conferences).
54 WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3(a) (2003) (stating that when
2003]
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interest,5 5 and informed decision making. 56 The extension of
lawyer-like responsibilities to adjusters only occurred in Jones
after the court assumed, without challenge, that at least some
professional legal services in furtherance of pre-lawsuit
settlements may be similarly undertaken by lawyers and
nonlawyers alike. 57 That is, the court assumed that the acts
done by Christy Klein did not involve the unauthorized practice
of law.58  Should all pre-lawsuit third-party settlement
initiatives by nonlawyer insurance company adjusters be barred
as unauthorized if properly challenged, or should only certain
pre-lawsuit professional legal services be barred? Assuming
there are certain pre-lawsuit settlement acts that may be
undertaken by insurance company adjusters in third-party
settings without any unauthorized legal practice, should
professional legal services standards always apply, or should
applicable standards at times originate in other legal sources,
such as state insurance department regulations?
A Unauthorized Practice of Law
Where the practice of law is defined, professional legal
services standards typically encompass pre-lawsuit civil claim
settlement initiatives undertaken on behalf of others. For
example, in Washington, where Jones was decided, the supreme
court has expressly defined the practice of law as embodying,
inter alia, "[g]iving advice or counsel to others as to their legal
rights or the legal rights or responsibilities of others for fees or
other consideration," as well as negotiating "legal rights or
"dealing on behalf of a client" with an unrepresented person, a lawyer should "not
state or imply" that the lawyer is disinterested and should "make reasonable efforts
to correct" any misunderstanding as to the lawyer's interests).
55 Id. R. 1.7(b) (stating that normally a lawyer shall not represent a client
where the lawyer's work "may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests").
56 Id. R. 1.4(b) (stating that a lawyer "shall explain" all matters so that the
client can "make informed decisions regarding the representation"). While the Jones
court did not find that the Joneses were clients of Christy Klein, it seemingly found
that the Joneses thought they were clients due to the "lack of an adversarial
posture" and that therefore Klein should have explained "the inherent conflict of
interest in the settlement process." Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1079
n.22 (Wash. 2002).
5 See Jones, 45 P.3d at 1079.
,, See id. at 1077.
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responsibilities on behalf of' others. 59 This rule is not limited to
litigation settings, 60 yet all settlement initiatives that involve
advice or negotiation advanced by insurance company adjusters
representing the civil claim interests of insureds are seemingly
not unauthorized, as evidenced by the implicit ruling in Jones.6 ,
Are there, however, certain pre-lawsuit settlement acts involving
third-party adjusting that should be unauthorized?
Seemingly, acts by insurance company adjusters involving
the drafting of legal documents to initiate pre-lawsuit
settlements with third parties, such as the Joneses, should be
unauthorized. A Washington Court Rule defines the practice of
law, in part, as drafting legal documents or agreements affecting
legal rights.6 2 Pre-lawsuit settlements between insurers and
third parties will not be deterred much, or made unduly
burdensome or costly, if only the drafting is left exclusively to
lawyers. Interestingly, in Jones there was no significant judicial
inquiry into how Klein helped the Joneses secure payment from
Farmers or how she helped them obtain "subrogation waivers."6 3
B. Application of Professional Legal Services Standards
1. Ex Parte Communications
Assuming there are no unauthorized legal practice barriers,
can professional legal services standards be applied to third-
party adjusters for communicative acts extending beyond those
directed at unrepresented third parties as found in Jones?
Consider, for example, whether Klein would be held to
professional legal services standards on ex parte
communications involving possible France family and Allstate
-'9 WASH. GEN. R. 24(a)(1), (4).
60 See id.
6" While third-party adjusting involving settlement talks between those hurt by
insureds and nonlawyer insurance company employees may involve authorized legal
practices, other third-party adjusting may not. See, e.g., Utah State Bar v.
Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 872 (Utah 1995) (finding that third-party
adjusting involving public adjusters who settle with the insurers of alleged
tortfeasors on behalf of those hurt by insureds falls within the unauthorized
practice of law).
62 WASH. GEN. R. 24(a)(2).
63 Jones, 45 P.3d at 1071 (stating only that there were subrogation waivers but
not exploring how they were obtained). Subrogation waivers were presumably
obtained from Terry Jones's own insurer, Farmers, from whom Klein helped Terry
receive benefits. Id.
2003]
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liability had the Joneses then been represented by counsel.
Some American ex parte contact standards forbid a lawyer from
communicating "with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by a[nother] lawyer" unless the other lawyer
consents or there is authorization, while other standards forbid
lawyer communications only "with a party" known to be
represented. 64 In either setting, assuming the rules operate
differently, as only in the latter might pending litigation be a
factor, should Klein be held to these lawyer conduct standards?6 5
2. Confidentiality
Consider, as well, whether Klein would be obligated to
maintain the confidentiality of information about the accident
that she received from Jeremy France and other France family
members, from the Joneses, or from disinterested occurrence
witnesses. Would any such obligations differ as between
information contained in documents or other tangible things and
information obtained from oral conversations or visual
observations that are merely floating about in Klein's head? Of
course, state professional legal services standards usually
require confidentiality of most information flowing between a
64 Compare, e.g., OR. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A) (2003)
(stating that while representing a client, a lawyer shall not "[c]ommunicate or cause
another to communicate on the subject of the representation ... with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by a lawyer on that subject ... unless: (a) the
lawyer has the prior consent of a lawyer representing such other person"), with
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2(a) (2003) ("In representing a client, a
lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party
the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."). While
appearing to be different, legal practice standards involving parties are sometimes
read to include persons who are not in litigation at the time. Compare Weider
Sports Equip. Co. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502, 505 (D. Utah 1996)
(reading a state ex parte contact rule involving a "party" to apply only after
litigation has commenced), with Johnson v. Cadillac Plastic Group, Inc., 930 F.
Supp. 1437, 1440-41 (D. Colo. 1996) (adopting most of the Weider court's rationale
but finding that a state ex parte rule involving a "party" can apply to pre-lawsuit
acts as long as an "adversarial relationship" has arisen). A recent decision surveying
the states' ex parte contact rules is Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. v. Harvard
College, 764 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. 2002).
C,5 For a possible answer to this, see, e.g., the standards in Maine where only
lawyer representatives of municipal employees involved in employment grievances
cannot undertake ex parte contacts with town officials. Me. Bd. of Overseers of the
Bar, Profl Ethics Comm'n, Op. 181 (2003).
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client and a lawyer. 66 At times the confidentiality of attorney-
client communications have included certain information
secured from an insured by the insurer's nonlawyer adjuster. 67
In Jones, however, the insured France family members at
relevant times seemingly had no lawyer. Should Klein
nevertheless be barred from revealing to the Joneses what the
Frances told her?
Further, confidentiality standards can also include work
product.68 Work product encompasses materials prepared in
view of litigation and thus would include certain materials
received from occurrence witnesses by insurance company
adjusters investigating claims.6 9 In Jones, however, there may
,G See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003) ("A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
gives informed consent .. "). As most ABA suggestions are followed, American
state laws typically will require, to some degree, attorneys to maintain
confidentiality of attorney-client communications and of work product documents
and other tangible things prepared by an attorney in anticipation of or in
preparation for litigation involving civil claim interests of clients. Some state
professional legal services standards expressly recognize that confidentiality applies
to both attorney-client communications and to certain work product. See, e.g., N.C.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2003) (stating that "[t]he confidentiality
rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also
to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source").
G7 See, e.g., Exline v. Exline, 659 N.E.2d 407, 410-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(finding that privilege attached to a communication about a fire between one
insured and an insurance company employee that was prompted when a third-party
sought recovery from the insurer for harm caused by the fire where a second
insured was the only defendant sued later by the third-party; the court reasoned
that the insured spoke when she knew of the possibility of a lawsuit against her and
could reasonably assume statements given to the insurer would be transmitted later
to an attorney in order to protect her interests). Compare Pfender v. Torres, 765
A.2d 208, 214-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (concluding that no attorney-
client privilege attached because there was no lawyer yet involved and the insurer
could easily be using the adjuster to promote the insurer's interests in avoiding
policy coverage), with Cutchin v. State, 792 A.2d 359, 366-67 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2002) (similar).
68 Ordinary work product-materials prepared in view of litigation that do not
contain attorneys' opinions, mental impressions, theories and the like-is not
always subject to confidentiality duties. Compare, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)
(stating that trial preparation materials remain confidential unless there is "a
showing that the party ... has a substantial need of the materials" and "is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means"), with ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(b)(2) ("Material prepared by or for a party
in preparation for trial is subject to discovery only if it does not contain or disclose
the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of the party's attorney.").
6 See, e.g., Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 800 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001) (finding that witness statements in insurance company claim files
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have been no reasonable anticipation of civil litigation between
the Joneses and the Frances. 70 Under the facts of the case, could
Christy Klein have shown the Joneses any documents pertinent
to the accident that she prepared or secured from occurrence
witnesses?
It is not clear in Jones that the Frances would always be
Klein's clients for any lawyer-client confidentiality purposes. For
example, the Frances may not be clients of an Allstate-hired
lawyer if they and Allstate were then involved in an insurance
policy dispute. It is not even clear the Joneses would never be
legal services clients of Klein, even when she works with lawyers
hired by Allstate solely to represent the Frances. For example,
the Joneses may be clients if they reasonably believed Klein was
working to secure settlements for them of at least some civil
claims arising from the accident. Further, even assuming Klein
had no lawyer-client confidentiality duties, 71 her information
gathering on the circumstances of the accident and on any
resulting claims may be work product developed on behalf of the
Frances or perhaps the Joneses. 72 Has Klein sufficiently acted
as a lawyer so that her tangible records may contain absolutely
privileged opinion work product or that her recollections of
conversations about the accident could not be examined by the
Joneses through questions at a deposition or in court because a
lawyer usually is prevented from being "an ordinary witness"?73
are protected work product only if litigation involving the company was foreseeable
at the time of the taking of the statements, as when an insured threatened suit
against the company; otherwise, the files are "ordinary course of... business"
documents).
70 See, e.g., Kidwiler v. Progressive Paloverde Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 536, 542
(N.D. W. Va. 2000) (employing a case-by-case approach, the court found that pre-
lawsuit documents prepared by the insurer's agents who consulted with the insured
constitute work product only where there is a "'substantial and imminent' or 'fairly
foreseeable threat of litigation' "); Evans v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 541 S.E.2d
782, 788-91 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (similar).
71 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (noting that "the protective
cloak" of the attorney-client privilege does not usually "extend to information which
an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of
litigation").
72 Id. at 511 (defining work product as "all written materials obtained or
prepared" by counsel "with an eye toward litigation").
7: Id. at 513. Tips on how insurance adjusters' claim files may be accessed or
protected from fishing expeditions are found in periodicals. Robert L. Reibold,
Cutting the Fishing Trip Short: Protecting an Adjuster's Claims File, S.C. LAW.,
July-Aug. 2000, at 33; Robert L. Reibold, The Big Catch: An Adjuster's Claim File,
S.C. LAW., May-June 2000, at 14. Effective pre-lawsuit strategies regarding both
[Vol.77:603
20031 INSURANCE COMPANY ADJUSTERS
3. Settlement Authority
Finally, 4 consider professional legal services standards on
settlement authority. Could Klein ever bind any France family
members to settlements involving their own financial
responsibilities to the Joneses? Professional legal services
standards typically provide that a lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision on the settlement of a civil claim unless the lawyer has
been expressly delegated settlement authority by the client.75
The Allstate policy may have recognized such authority in
Allstate, at least where there is no conflict of interest between
Allstate and its insureds, especially if there are no actual
monetary payments to be made and no potential financial
benefits to be lost by the insureds. What of an agreement that
Klein arranged with the Joneses under which the Joneses would
receive additional monies from the Frances as well as the policy
limits from Allstate? Would any precedents on the implied or
apparent authority of an attorney to settle come into play?76
access and protection are, however, difficult where different forums are available for
future litigation and where the standards for work product, as well as privileged
communications, vary significantly between forums. See, e.g., Coregis Ins. Co. v.
Law Offices of Carole F. Kafrissen, P.C., 57 Fed. Appx. 58, 60 (3d Cir. 2003)
(observing that unlike the attorney-client privilege, where federal courts apply state
law when state law claims are heard for work product disputes, the federal courts
employ a uniform federal standard that is not required in state courts); Lectrolarm
Custom Sys., Inc. v. Pelco Sales, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 567, 569-70 (E.D. Cal. 2002)
(stating that federal standards on both work product and privileged
communications apply when federal question claims are heard).
71 Other professional legal services standards may apply in third-party
adjusting settings. For example, could Klein ever represent France family members
where insurance coverage issues had arisen between the Frances and Allstate?
Lawyer conduct standards usually prohibit certain conflicts of interest between
lawyer and client; thus, there is the need for insurers to provide "independent"
counsel for insureds in litigation with third parties once certain coverage issues
emerge. Compare, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (Deering 2003) (providing for
independent counsel to insured), with State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Super. Ct., 265
Cal. Rptr. 372, 374-75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that an insurer can use same
adjuster where there are claims against an insured by a third party and claims
involving insurance contract coverage, though attorney for insured cannot be used
by insurer on coverage issue).
75 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22(1)
(2000) ("As between client and lawyer... the following... decisions are reserved to
the client except when the client has validly authorized the lawyer to make the
particular decision: whether and on what terms to settle a claim .... ").
7, See, e.g., id. § 26(1) (stating that a client may expressly or impliedly
authorize a lawyer's act); id. § 27 (stating that a lawyer's apparent authority is
based upon the "client's... manifestations of such authorization").
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C. Insurance Law Duties
Assuming no unauthorized legal practice barriers, insurance
law duties embodied in varying legal sources such as statutes
and administrative agency pronouncements may also speak to
pre-lawsuit settlement talk activities involving third-party
adjusting. Thus, in New York, the Insurance Department Office
of General Counsel has informally opined that it is "improper for
an independent adjuster to communicate directly with a
claimant known to be represented by counsel," relying on a 1939
pact between lawyer and insurer groups and finding it
"consistent" with the "well-known obligation of an attorney.""
In Florida, the Administrative Code has an ethics code for all
insurance adjusters that declares that an adjuster "shall not
negotiate or effect settlement directly or indirectly with any
third-party claimant represented by an attorney" without
consent of the attorney. 78
Insurance law duties can originate outside agency sources
and encompass pre-lawsuit acts of third-party adjusting that do
not involve ex parte contacts. For example, Montana statutes
deem as unfair claim settlement practices in third-party settings
"neglect[ing] to attempt in good faith" to settle claims in which
insurer liability is "reasonably clear,"79  and "fail[ing] to
acknowledge and act reasonably" upon communications about
claims.8 0 For a violation of the former, a statutory cause of
action is available to both the insured and a third-party
claimant.8 ' More generally, third-party adjusting can be
statutorily regulated through licensing laws for adjusters.8 2
77 Independent Adjuster's Contact with Claimant Represented by Counsel, Inf.
Op. N.Y. Ins. Dep't (July 12, 2001), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/rg
107121.htm (noting earlier comparable findings "for an adjuster, or any other
licensee"); 7 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 49.23 (2d
ed. 1996) (describing the agreement by stating that "[t]he [insurance] companies or
their representatives will not deal directly with any claimant [first party or third
party] represented by an attorney without the consent of the attorney").
78 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 4-220.201(4)(i) (2003) (specifying that third
parties do not include insureds or their resident relatives).
7) MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201(6) (2001).
80 Id. § 33-18-201(2).
81 See id. § 33-18-242(1). In Illinois, a cause of action founded on the pre-lawsuit
acts of an insurance adjuster toward a third-party claimant has been recognized in
case precedent. See Haddick v. Valor Ins., 763 N.E.2d 299 (Ill. 2001). While the
third-party claimant had been assigned all the insured's claims against the insurer,
the assignment came post-judgment, long after the discussed pre-lawsuit acts of the
insurer toward the third party. The insurer's pre-lawsuit responsibilities to settle
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There may be separation of powers limitations on such
regulatory or statutory pronouncements addressing pre-lawsuit
insurance law duties of adjusters to third parties. To the extent
such duties are viewed as authorizations for nonlawyers to
provide certain legal services, the duties may need to originate in
high court rules or precedents where the court has exclusive
lawmaking power regarding the practice of law.8 3 Also, the
creation of special pre-lawsuit settlement duties applicable to
insurance adjusters in third-party settings may not foreclose the
application of other more general statutory duties such as those
involving fair business practices. While the court in Jones did
not speak to the civil fraud and consumer protection claims
based on Klein's pre-lawsuit third-party relations, other courts
have recognized that insurance and consumer protection claims
can be pursued simultaneously.8 4
with the third party were intended primarily to benefit the insured, but the
damages recoverable seemed guided by harm extending beyond injury actually
incurred by the insured since the damages covered all of the third party's losses
without any showing that the insured had the assets to pay for all losses extending
beyond the liability limit in the insurance policy. See id. at 302-06.
82 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 626.864 (2002) (stating that a qualified individual
may be licensed and appointed as a public adjuster, an independent adjuster, or a
company employee adjuster); id. ch. 626.856 (stating that a company employee
adjuster ascertains and determines claims and losses and undertakes to effect
settlements).
83- See, e.g., Gmerek v. State Ethics Comm'n, 807 A.2d 812, 819 (Pa. 2002)
(declaring the Lobbying Disclosure Act to be unconstitutional as an impermissible
regulation of the practice of law); see also Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Picklo, 772 N.E.2d
1187, 1189 (Ohio 2002) (holding that unlawful detainer and landlord-tenant
statutes enlarged the pool eligible to practice law and were unconstitutional
infringements on inherent judicial powers). Of course, principles like comity may
prompt courts with self-proclaimed exclusive powers to yield to agency or General
Assembly dictates or at least to effectively permit their operation by failing to
address separation of powers issues. See, e.g., People v. Goodman, 8 N.E.2d 941, 944
(Ill. 1937) (finding that while the General Assembly may pass laws forbidding
certain legal practices, these laws can only augment and cannot "supersede or
detract from, the power of the judicial department to control the practice of law");
see also Linder v. Ins. Claims Consultants, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 612, 621 (S.C. 2002)
(noting that it is "the duty" of the high court and not the legislature "to delineate
the practice of law," while finding that the recently enacted statutory scheme
covering first party public adjusting "deals with [the court's] concerns
appropriately").
84 Compare Commonwealth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 A.2d 135, 139 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1999) (rejecting argument that claims under Unfair Insurance Practices Act
provided exclusive remedies and thus allowing Consumer Protection Law claims
against Allstate for the use of the same documents that Klein employed in the Jones
case), with M. Dematteo Constr. Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 146,
160 (D. Mass. 2001) (denying private claim against insurer for unfair settlement
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IV. SETTLEMENT TALKS DURING PENDING LAWSUITS
In Novak, insurance company adjusters' participation in
post-lawsuit settlement talks with third parties during judge-
requested pretrial conferences in pending civil cases was found
to create an obligation to follow the civil procedure standards
that guide lawyers.8 5  Are there other settings where civil
procedure standards should not guide the post-lawsuit
settlement conduct of adjusters since all such conduct is left to
lawyers and comparable acts by nonlawyers would constitute the
unauthorized practice of law? Assuming no unauthorized
practice barriers, should civil procedure standards always apply,
and apply similarly, to lawyers and third-party adjusters?
Finally, regardless of whether the standards on comparable
conduct differ, should at least certain standards for adjusters
come from sources other than civil procedure lawmakers, such as
state insurance department officials, especially where the
settlement activity by insurance company adjusters occurs
outside courthouses and beyond trial court direction?
A. Unauthorized Practice of Law
Definitions of legal practice usually include post-lawsuit
civil claim settlement initiatives undertaken on behalf of
others.8 6 Yet as implied in Jones and as expressly recognized in
professional legal services standards defining the practice of law
in Washington, 87 not all legal practice is exclusively left to
lawyers, even when there is litigation pending. In post-lawsuit
settings in Washington 88 and across the United States, 89
nonlawyers have long advocated on behalf of clients during
administrative agency adjudications. In Novak, an insurance
practices where insurance commissioner was afforded the "exclusive authority to
enforce" the statutory duty relied on by the claimant).
85 In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1405-06 (11th Cir. 1991).
86 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 cmt.
c (2000) ("In the absence of a contrary agreement or instruction, a lawyer normally
has authority to initiate or engage in settlement discussions, although not to
conclude them.").
87 See WASH. GEN. R. 24(a) (specifying that the practice of law includes
completing legal agreements that affect the legal rights of others and representing
parties in formal dispute resolution processes).
88 See id. R. 24(b)(3).
89 See, e.g., N. J. PRACTICE OF LAW R. 1:21-1(f) (permitting appearances by non-
attorneys in contested administrative agency cases in certain settings).
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company adjuster was required to act as a negotiator when
representing an insured who was a civil case defendant.90 Are
there limits on third party adjusting during civil litigation?
Consider, for example, the authority of an insurance
company adjuster to settle civil claims against an insured that
will be paid, in part, by both the insurer and by the insured.
Settlements involving payments only by insurers seemingly
involve no lawyer conduct standards, as adjusters act as agents
of insurers. Do civil procedure standards, however, that
presume lawyers possess settlement authority on behalf of their
clients during in-court proceedings, including judicially
supervised settlement talks occurring in courthouses, 91 apply to
insurance adjusters who speak about the insureds? There is
good reason to say no, including ultra vires concerns and
difficulty imagining the insured actually delegating settlement
authority regarding personal assets to the adjuster.
B. Application of Civil Procedure Standards
1. Confidentiality
Assuming no unauthorized legal practice barriers, can civil
procedure standards for lawyers be applied to third-party
adjusters for acts beyond the compelled appearances at pretrial
conferences found in Novak? For example, consider whether an
adjuster such as Christy Klein would be obligated at a deposition
to reveal information about the accident that she received from
Jeremy France and other France family members. Would any
obligation hinge on differences between information within
documents in Klein's possession and information about
conversations or observations floating about in Klein's head?92 If
Klein did maintain documents, would they be in the Frances'
90 932 F.2d at 1398-99. Presumably, as in Jones, an adjuster in Novak would
attend a settlement conference to facilitate resolution of not only insurance
company liability to third persons but also of the insured's personal liability to third
persons in order to satisfy the insurer's duty to defend.
91 See, e.g., Brewer v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1332-33
(Ill. 1995).
92 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1947) (recognizing that
some tangible attorney-obtained work product may be discoverable from the client
but excluding formal discovery where ordinary work product may only be obtained
by orally questioning the attorney as a witness).
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control?9 3 Would any applicable lawyer-client communications
privileges or work-product immunities recognized under civil
procedure standards treat differently Klein's pre-lawsuit and
post-lawsuit information gathering aimed at facilitating
settlements?
2. Sanctions for Litigation Misconduct
Consider, as well, whether Klein could be sanctioned for
helping to present frivolous pleadings, 94 discovery documents, 95
or other litigation papers 96 in a civil lawsuit filed by the Joneses
against the Frances in which Klein helped the lawyer
representing the Frances.
3. Negotiation Guidelines
Finally, consider whether Klein could be held to any
settlement-talk guidelines that operate for lawyers. Some
guidelines may emerge from the "Ethical Guidelines for
Settlement Negotiations" approved by the American Bar
Association in August of 2002.97 If such guidelines apply, the
possible sanctions flowing from Klein's breach of settlement-talk
guidelines may differ from the possible sanctions flowing from an
attorney's breach.98
9:1 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1) (stating that a party may request any other party to
produce documents "in the possession, custody or control" of the other party).
,94 See, e.g., id. 11(c) (stating that sanctions may be directed against "attorneys,
law firms, or parties").
95 5 See, e.g., id. 37(b) (stating that sanctions based on failures to obey a formal
discovery order may be directed against "a party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a party or a person designated ... to testify on behalf of a party"; "a
deponent"; or "the attorney advising" the party who fails to obey the order); id. 37(d)
(stating that sanctions for other formal discovery failures may be directed against "a
party"; "an officer, director, or managing agent of a party"; or "the attorney
advising" the party who fails to act properly).
91; See, e.g., id. 16(f) (stating that sanctions for pretrial conference misconduct
may be directed against "a party or [a] party's attorney"); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000)
(providing that liability for excessive costs caused during federal civil litigation by
unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings may be imposed on "[a]ny
attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases").
117 ABA Delegates Approve Proposals to Allow Some Multijurisdictional Practice
by Lawyers, 71 U.S.L.WK. 2106, 2106 (Aug. 20, 2002) (describing guidelines
endorsed by the ABA); ABA Litigation Section Issues Guidelines on Ethical Issues in
Negotiating Settlements, 70 U.S.L.WK. 2776, 2776-77 (June 11, 2002) (describing
guidelines that address such matters as misrepresentation, secrecy pacts, document
disposal, and settlements through "extortionate means").
J8 Lawyers engaged in misconduct, unlike adjusters, may be subject to attorney
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C. Insurance Law Duties
Assuming no unauthorized legal practice barriers, insurance
law duties within agency pronouncements or statutes may also
speak to post-lawsuit settlement talk activities involving third-
party adjusting. Often, however, no distinction exists between
pre-lawsuit and post-lawsuit acts in such written laws. Thus,
the Texas Administrative Code simply says that no insurer shall
engage in unfair claim settlement practices, including "refusing
to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation
based upon all available information" and "not attempting in
good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of
claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably
clear."99 Similarly, a West Virginia statute bars certain acts as
"[u]nfair claim settlement practices" if the acts are part of "a
general business practice," including duties like those found in
the Texas Administrative Code.' 00 Application of such written
laws to post-lawsuit acts undertaken in courthouses, as with
litigation paper presentations, could prompt separation of
powers issues if reasonable inquiry is not made or bad faith
occurs in settlement conference conduct when liability is clear.
Reasonable inquiries preceding all litigation papers might need
to be guided by a single civil procedure rule, especially where
high court authority over procedure is primary, if not exclusive.
For insurance company adjusters, however, good faith
settlement duties, even during civil litigation, may differ from
litigation paper presentations duties, especially if settlement
acts are deemed substantive in nature and therefore require
special standards limited to the insurance context. 10'
disciplinary referrals. See Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435,
452 (D. Md. 2002) (involving the referral of a lawyer to the disciplinary committee
for misrepresenting material facts during settlement negotiations). Yet, if adjusters
were licensed by high courts as limited legal practice officers, other boards could
receive comparable referrals. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIS. PRAC. R. 12(b)(2)(v) (stating
that the Limited Practice Board certifies nonlawyers as limited practice closing
officers and investigates and adjudicates allegations of their misconduct).
99 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.203(15) (West 2003); id. § 21.203(4).
100 W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (2003).
101 Written laws expressly or implicitly recognizing insurance company good
faith duties to third-party claimants are most likely to be deemed substantive. See
Stewart v. Mitchell Transp. Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1316 (D. Kan. 2002) (finding
third party was not the beneficiary of the insurer's contractual obligation to act in
good faith on behalf of the insured).
20031 623
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
Acting both before and during lawsuits, insurance company
adjusters help facilitate settlements of civil claims involving
their companies, their insureds, and those harmed by company
insureds. While some lawyer conduct standards have been
applied to third-party adjusting, many related issues remain.
Further, even certain developed rules are troublesome, both
substantively and on separation of powers grounds. Serious
reflection on a single question would help a great deal. We
should explore the circumstances under which insurance
company employees who undertake third-party adjustments
should be governed by the same or similar professional legal
services and civil procedure standards that govern lawyers who
facilitate civil claim settlements for their clients. In such an
exploration, we should distinguish between authorized and
unauthorized legal practice acts; pre-lawsuit and post-lawsuit
settlement acts; conduct before and after lawyers are retained;
administrative, legislative, and judicial lawmaking
responsibilities; and conduct within and outside of courthouses.
For pre-lawsuit conduct we should chiefly look to
administrative agency or general assembly guidance, with
lawyer conduct standards occasionally providing insights. Thus,
it seems preferable for an administrative agency or a general
assembly to speak to most of Christy Klein's actions in adjusting
the third-party claims of the Joneses. Should a court speak, it
should usually do so through written standards on the practice of
law and not, as in Jones, on a case-by-case basis.
For post-lawsuit conduct we should chiefly look to high court
rule making involving either professional legal services or civil
procedure standards. Civil procedure standards should govern
adjusters who talk settlement in courthouses, while professional
legal services standards should typically regulate third-party
adjustment talks outside courthouses to the extent there are no
unauthorized legal practice barriers, especially where insurance
company adjusters operate under the direction of lawyers.
The time is ripe to discuss and implement broad legal
guidelines on third-party adjusting. Recent cases suggest there
can regularly arise confusion, serious instances of adjuster
misconduct, and separation of powers issues in circumstances
involving third-party adjusters.
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